# IT:AD:SQuaRE # [[../|(UP)]] {{indexmenu>.#2|nsort tsort}} * See also: * [[IT/AD/ISO 25010/]] * [[IT/AD/ISO 9126/]] * [[IT/AD/FURPS/]] * [[IT/AD/Supplemental Specifications/]] * [[IT/AD/Functional Requirements/]] * [[IT/AD/Non-Functional Requirements/]] The acronym `SQuaRE` is used in the following cases: * System Quality Requirements Engineering * Security Quality Requirements Engineering They both follow the same 9 steps, more or less. ## Notes #### System System Quality Requirements Engineering (SQUARE) is a process model developed at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU). SQUARE provides a means for eliciting, categorizing, and prioritizing *security* requirements for information technology systems and applications. The focus of the model is to build *security* and *quality* concepts *into the early stages* of the analysing, development, development stages of the development life cycle. * Agree on definitions * Identify security goals * Develop artifacts to support security requirements definition * Assess risks * Select elicitation technique(s) * Elicit security requirements * Categorize requirements * Prioritize requirements * Inspect requirements #### Security 0. Agree on *Definitions* * Input: Candidate definitions from IEEE and other standards * Techniques: Structured interviews, focus group * Participants: Stakeholders, requirements engineer * Output: Agreed-to definitions 2. Identify *Assets* and *Security Goals* * Input: Definitions, candidate goals, business drivers, policies and procedures, examples * Techniques: Facilitated work session, surveys, interviews * Participants: Stakeholders, requirements engineer * Output: Assets and goals 3. Develop *artifacts* to support *security* requirements definition * Input: Potential artifacts (e.g., scenarios, misuse cases, templates, forms) * Techniques: Work session * Participants: Requirements engineer * Output: Needed artifacts: scenarios, misuse cases, models, templates, forms 4. Perform *Risk Assessment* Input: Misuse cases, scenarios, security goals Techniques: Risk assessment method, analysis of anticipated risk against organizational risk tolerance, including threat analysis Participants: Requirements engineer, risk expert, stakeholders Output: Risk assessment results 5. Select *elicitation Techniques* * Input: Goals, definitions, candidate techniques, expertise of stakeholders, organizational style, culture, level of security needed, cost benefit analysis, etc. * Techniques: Work session * Participants: Requirements engineer * Output: Selected elicitation techniques 6. Elicit *Security Requirements* * Input: Artifacts, risk assessment results, selected techniques * Techniques: Joint Application Development (JAD), interviews, surveys, model-based analysis, checklists, lists of reusable requirements types, document reviews * Participants: Stakeholders facilitated by requirements engineer * Output: Initial cut at security requirements 7. Categorize Requirements as to Level (System, Software, etc.) and Whether They Are Requirements or Other Kinds of Constraints * Input: Initial requirements, architecture * Techniques: Work session using a standard set of categories * Participants: Requirements engineer, other specialists as needed * Output: Categorized requirements 8. Prioritize Requirements * Input: Categorized requirements and risk assessment results * Techniques: Prioritization methods such as Triage, Win-Win * Participants: Stakeholders facilitated by requirements engineer * Output: Prioritized requirements 9. Inspect Requirements * Input: Prioritized requirements, candidate formal inspection technique * Techniques: Inspection methods such as Fagan, peer reviews * Participants: Inspection team * Output: Initial selected requirements, documentation of decision-making process and rationale ## Resources * http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=35683 * http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_ics/catalogue_detail_ics.htm?csnumber=64764 * https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:25000:ed-2:v1:en * http://www.ittoday.info/ITPerformanceImprovement/Articles/2012-01Merkow.html